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This paper aims to examine different hypotheses concerning the effects of guanxi on the reward-
based crowdfunding project fundraising. Specifically, this study provides new insights into how 
guanxi and guanxi intensity may affect reward-based crowdfunding success and project 




The research data including 989 crowdfunding projects was collected from zhongchou.com 
which is the largest reward-based crowdfunding platform in a one-year period (2014.1-2014.12). 
The hypotheses are tested by using robust OLS regressions and robust logistic regressions. 
Robustness check was also conducted in order to test the validation of our results. 
 
Findings 
This paper found that project developers’ guanxi-establishing behavior conducted before 
launching their own projects such as being fans of other projects and supporting other projects 
are positively related to project success. In addition, the intensity of guanxi-establishing behavior 
positively influences project performance in a significant way.  Besides, the establishment and 
maintenance of project developers’ guanxi with funders during the fundraising process are also 
positively associated with project success and fundraising performance.  
 
Originality/value 
Based on the theory of trust, this paper offers an interesting and novel perspective to investigate 
reward-based crowdfunding success in the Chinese context by taking guanxi and guanxi intensity 
into consideration.  
 
 






Crowdfunding as a new financing tool is increasingly becoming common globally. The concept 
of crowdfunding emerged from the broader concept of crowdsourcing, which implies using the 
“crowd” to as a source of ideas, feedback, and solutions to develop corporate activities 
(Belleflamme et al., 2013). The global crowdfunding market grew from 1.5 billion USD in 2011, 
to 2.7 billion USD in 2012, 6.1 billion USD in 2013, 16.2 billion USD in 2014 and an estimated 
volume of 34.4 billion USD in 2015(World Bank, 2013).  
Though financing startups through crowdfunding are growing fast and have emerged as a viable 
method of funding new ventures, academic research on crowdfunding is emerging. A number of 
peer-viewed work on crowdfunding has been published (e.g., Mollick, 2014). Previous 
crowdfunding research is mainly focused on participant motivation, campaign success, 
regulation and institutions (Ramos, 2014). Among these research perspectives, crowdfunding 
success research is dominating (e.g., Mollick, 2014; Xu et al., 2014; Kuppuswamy & Bayrus, 
2014; Giudici et al., 2013). Based on signaling theory (Spence,2002), through analyzing real 
crowdfunding platform data, prior research has found out a list of success factors for successful 
fundraising such as entrepreneur’s human capital (Zheng et al., 2016), campaign’s quality signals 
(e.g., Mollick, 2014) and entrepreneur’s social networking (Colombo et al., 2015).  
Differ from the rule-based western countries, China is well known as a guanxi-based economy 
(Boisot & Child, 1996). Prior research has identified the significant role of interpersonal trust 
(guanxi) in doing business in China (Chung & Hamilton, 2001). According to The World Bank, 
the total market potential is estimated to be up to 90-96 billion per year by 2025. The largest 
market and market growth is expected to be in China, which accounts for about 46-50 billion 
USD (World Bank, 2013). To develop the most potential crowdfunding market, it is not only 
important but also meaningful to understand how interpersonal trust (guanxi) influences the 
performance of the crowdfunding campaign in the Chinese context. To mitigate this research gap, 
this paper employed the trust theory to examine how the interpersonal trust (guanxi) between 
entrepreneurs and funders affects reward-based crowdfunding success. By analyzing the data 
collected from the largest reward-based crowdfunding platform (zhongchou.com) in China, we 
found out the established guanxi between entrepreneurs and funders is positively associated with 
crowdfunding campaign success. Furthermore, stronger guanxi leads to better campaign 
performance.  
Culture has an important effect on an individual’s social life and that people from different 
cultural backgrounds have different beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Staber, 2006). Compared to 
the studies based on western crowdfunding platforms, little research has been done based on the 
Chinese context. Theoretically, this study introduces the theory of trust to the crowdfunding 
literature. Based on the theory of trust, this paper is one of the first empirical paper to investigate 
the effects of guanxi on the performance of reward-based crowdfunding in China. The results of 
this study offer a novel way to understand crowdfunding success in the Chinese context. In 
addition, it also provides practical suggestions for crowdfunding platform creators and project 
developers. 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. First, literature reviews about crowdfunding 
and trust were introduced. Then, hypotheses are developed based on the first part. Next, data 
sources, selection procedure, and variable measurement were explained. Empirical results were 
introduced in the next section. In the last section, discussion, implications, and limitations are 
discussed.  
Literature review 
Crowdfunding and reward-based crowdfunding 
Mollick (2014) defines crowdfunding in an entrepreneurial context as “Crowdfunding refers to 
the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups (cultural, social, and for-profit) to fund their 
ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of 
individuals using the internet, without standard financial intermediaries.” Crowdfunding business 
models can be divided into four types: donation-based, reward-based, equity-based and loan-
based according to different exchange content between creators and investors (Massolution, 
2013). Based on their different characteristics, these four types can be described by three 
categories: donation model, passive investment model and active investment model 
(Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2010). Crowdfunding based on donation has long been applied for 
financing not-for-profit and NGOs projects (Defourny et al. 2010). In passive investment model, 
funders have no other interaction or communication with entrepreneurs except having investing 
rewards, tailored products, honorary recognition, or other kinds of sharing from crowdfunding 
projects. However, active investments offer crowdfunding investors more opportunities to 
communicating and interacting with entrepreneurs or project creators. Often investors participate 
in the project’s executing process. Active investors can help design new features, test the product, 
and provide development paths and feedback (Lehner, 2013).  
In this paper, we focus on reward-based crowdfunding. Reward-based crowdfunding can be 
defined as “an open call, essentially through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources 
either in form of donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or voting rights in order 
to support initiatives for specific purposes” (Lambert & Schwienbacher, 2010). Belleflamme et 
al. (2013) list three key characteristics of reward-based crowdfunding: First, it often relies on the 
advanced purchase of products that are not available on the market. Entrepreneurs who start 
crowdfunding projects describe what the final product will be and offer a list of nonmonetary 
rewards for potential funders who are willing to invest. Second, funders pay more costs in the 
pre-ordering process than traditional consumers. The costs include time and communication cost. 
Third, funders identify themselves as active participants involved in the whole product creation 
process, which ranges from the initial investment of money to direct involvement in the 
crowdfunding campaign.  
Theory of Trust  
Trust has been studied in various disciplines and contexts such as psychological, sociological and 
economic (Wang & Emurian, 2004). Mayer et al. (1995) conceptualize trust as the “willingness 
of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party”.  In general, trust refers to a dependence on the integrity, ability, or 
character of a person or a thing. In other words, it means that the trustor has confidence that the 
trustee will care about his or her benefits, and that the trustor is willing to rely on the trustee’s 
decision even when the result is not visible immediately (Kini & Choobineh, 1998). Trust is the 
willingness to rely on another party and to take action in circumstances where such action makes 
one vulnerable to the other party (Doney et al., 1998). Shapiro et al. (1992) conclude that trust 
has three bases: 1. Trust based on deterrence emphasizes costs and benefits. 2. Trust based on 
knowledge emphasizes the target understanding. 3. Trust based on identification emphasized the 
common values. 
Trust studies in the business context are not new. A trust-based relationship is widely recognized 
as one of the most significant factors for many successful companies or organizations 
(McAllister, 1995). The notion of information asymmetry makes trust of great importance for 
business transactions. Trust can benefit companies by reducing their transaction costs, increasing 
their flexibility and efficiency, and helping them to  design  their  future  marketing  plans  or  
strategies  more  accurately (Chen & Dhillon, 2003). Most business transactions need to take 
trust into consideration in order to be successful. According to James (2002), trust is essential in 
economic exchanges. Viewed from an economic standpoint, trust is an expectation that people 
will not be exploited by others.  Wang and Emurian (2004) conclude that trustor and trustee, 
vulnerability, produced actions and subjective matter as four characteristics of trust.   
With the emergence and fast growth of online business, scholars have shown a strong interest in 
investigating the information asymmetry issue between buyers and sellers in the context of trust 
(Connelly et al., 2010). Information asymmetry can be defined as the cost of information 
gathering, monitoring and distributing. (Agrawal et al., 2011). Trust and trust-building 
mechanisms are of great importance to solve such issues in the context of e-business (e.g., Ba & 
Pavlou, 2002). With Trust, perceived uncertainty and risk associated with anonymous online 
exchanges can be reduced. At the same time, consumers can feel more confident when 
exchanging personal information and purchasing goods online (Ba & Pavlou, 2002). Pavlou 
(2003) suggests that trust play a key role in explaining the online consumer’s behavior. Building 
and maintaining trust in the online distribution channel is more important than in an offline 
environment has emerged as a consensus among scholars. Grabner-Krauter & Kaluscha (2003) 
argue that the degree of uncertainty of trust is greater in an online environment. Unlike trust, that 
has been defined by different scholars in different dimensions, in the case of the online trust, 
there is no consensus rather a multi-dimension view according to Lee and Turban (2001) and 
Yoon (2002)’s. Ganguly et al. (2010) define online trust to be “perceived credibility and 
benevolence of the online store in the eyes of consumer” in an online store context based on 
Stephens (2004)’s. In terms of crowdfunding, there are three stakeholders involved in trust 
creating: funders, entrepreneurs/founders and the platform. As a result, two different trust forms 
have emerged: interpersonal-based trust and institution-based trust (Tan & Sutherland, 2004). As 
a guanxi-based economy (Boisot & Child, 1996), interpersonal trust (guanxi) is of great 
importance in doing business in China (Chung & Hamilton, 2001). 
Interpersonal trust in China: guanxi  
Interpersonal trust refers to the individual’s trust and beliefs about the others in the context of a 
transaction. In the context of this study, it refers to the trust-building mechanisms between 
entrepreneurs and investors. In this study, interpersonal trust can be specifically defined as the 
potential funder’s trust towards project initiator on a crowdfunding platform. In China, 
interpersonal trust is more important than institutional trust. Because such interpersonal trust 
offers an informal but effective way to deal with business transactions when formal legal 
sanctions are void or ineffective. In this case, it is interesting and relevant to understand why 
some projects get successfully funded while others not on the same crowdfunding platform in 
China.    
Chinese potential funders may not invest in the projects which they may be interested in because 
of the “perceived risk” they see (Chellappa, 2008). Kim et al. (2008) define perceived risk as a 
consumer's belief about the potential uncertain negative outcomes from the online transaction. 
Cho and Lee (2006) refer to perceived risk as an individual's biased assessment of a risk situation 
which is highly dependent on the individual's psychological and situational characteristics. 
Perceived risk precedes consumers' trust has been tested by various studies in online business. In 
China, the perceived risk of crowdfunding transaction comes from the void of institutional trust 
in crowdfunding, in addition to information asymmetry.  
Interpersonal trust is also a kind of dispositional trust. Rotter (1971) firstly deduce the concept of 
dispositional trust based on psychological research. Dispositional trust can be explained as one’s 
personality-driven capacity to show trust in general (Tan & Sutherland, 2004).  Such ability is 
obtained from the belief that other ones are reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, generally, 
different people vary in their propensity to trust based on their distinctive personality. 
Dispositional trust as something endogenous and can be accumulated with more interaction 
(McKnight et al., 1998). Guanxi is a Chinese word referring to interpersonal nexus. It has been 
defined as the fundamental organizational principle of Chinese society (Fei, 1992). Closer guanxi 
between two partners helps their relationship move toward and then generate trust (Fukuyama, 
1995). Specifically, in an online business context, buyers and sellers must create some form of 
guanxi. Lack of protection due to weak institutional environment and lack of institutional-based 
trust pushes online business participants to rely on interpersonal relationships to conduct 
transactions. They must depend on guanxi in the absence of systemic rules in order to alleviate 
the risk of e-business (Martinsons, 2008). Therefore, guanxi can be explained as a tool to 
generate trust by mitigating perceived risk.  
Besides，guanxi is the result of the unique Chinese culture and social background. Hofstede 
(1980) mentions that a high degree of collectivism is one key aspect of Chinese culture. 
Therefore, one outstanding feature of Chinese culture is the close personal relationship (Casimir 
et al., 2006). Specifically, Hui and Triandis (1986) suggest that Chinese people belong to strong 
and cohesive in-groups such as extended families from birth onward. As a result, Chinese behave 
differently by distinguishing in-groupers and out-groupers. For in-groupers (people with guanxi), 
they would like to pay more attention to help or cooperate. In contrast, out-groupers (people 
without guanxi) will get no trust from in-groupers (Fukuyama, 1995).  
However, guanxi cannot be treated merely as a cultural phenomenon. Guanxi was of great 
importance for business practice in distrust and hostile colonial environment (Kiong & Kee, 
1998). Guanxi has been embedded in the daily practices of the Chinese business community 
(Chung & Hamilton, 2001). Lee and Dawes (2005) refer to guanxi as a formality or necessary 
procedure which people must go through in order to establish an intention to conduct business 
with one another. Chinese businessmen treat guanxi as a primary medium for business 
relationships (Chung & Hamilton, 2001). Guanxi is fundamental to Chinese economic 
transactions. The establishment of guanxi depends on guanxi base. Jacobs (1979) refers to 
guanxi base as “a base which two or more persons have a commonality of shared identification”. 
In a business perspective, Kiong and Kee (1998) mention that trade associations can be seen as 
guanxi base. Trade associations gather information to generate opportunities for guanxi 
establishment between potential buyers and sellers. In e-business context, such interaction can 
help transfer visitors into buyers as well as help sellers establish a relationship with buyers (e.g., 
Teo et al., 2003) through interpersonal relationship establishment and social communication 
(Chen & Chen, 2004).  
Hypotheses development 
Differ from the rule-based western countries, China is organized by a relation-based system (Li 
et al., 2004). In a relation-based system, formal legal sanctions are sometimes not enough to 
facilitate performance of exchange (Kiong & Kee, 1998). In terms of crowdfunding, as a new 
fundraising channel, not enough regulations are established by the government to supervise the 
crowdfunding market in China. As a result, funders’ evaluation of crowdfunding projects by 
assessing the quality signals cannot be well supported. Without a well-established regulation 
system, the project’s quality signals will not reduce information asymmetry effectively. Because 
signalers (developers) and receivers (funders) have partially distinct interests (Johnstone & 
Grafen, 1993). Therefore, inferior signalers have the incentive to produce false signals to cheat 
receivers. For instance, in a weak institutional supervision environment, project developers may 
exaggerate or overstate their project quality in order to get successful fundraising (Gregg & 
Walczak, 2008). Therefore, in order to facilitate project quality evaluation, interpersonal trust 
must be taken into consideration. When the institutional trust is void or ineffective, it offers an 
informal but effective way to decrease information asymmetry. Interpersonal trust describes a 
person’s trust and belief about the others. In the crowdfunding context, it refers to the trust-
building mechanisms between project developers and potential funders. The interpersonal nexus 
in China is described by guanxi.  
Different to kinship as blood-based guanxi (Kiong & Kee, 1998), the guanxi between project 
developers and funders is based on social interaction which can be treated as social-based guanxi. 
In crowdfunding context, it offers a “comment area” to facilitate interactive communication 
process between founders and funders. In this area, founders can post their project update 
information and answer (potential) funders’ questions about their project. Funders can ask 
questions and leave comments about projects.  Founders can refine their projects based on 
funders’ advice or comments.  At the same time, potential funders will turn into funders as they 
have more instant feedback information from the initiators. Through this interactive 
communication process, founders and funders can communicate with each other, mitigate 
disagreements, overcome information asymmetries, negotiate refinement, and ultimately reach 
an outcome that is satisfactory for both sides. It is an effective mechanism to generate guanxi 
between founders and funders based on crowdfunding platform acting as guanxi base. This 
process helps to strengthen mutual understanding between founders and funders through this 
interactive communication. As a result, guanxi is generated. 
The crowdfunding platform is not only a fundraising marketplace but also an online community 
(Hui, Gerber & Greenberg, 2013). The platform offers interacting opportunities for potential 
funders and fund seekers. Therefore, the crowdfunding platform can be treated as a guanxi base 
(Kiong & Kee, 1998) which can be used to establish guanxi between funders and fund seekers. 
As a two-sided platform, a project developer can also be a project supporter at the same time 
(Zvilichovsky et al., 2014). If project developers have ever supported projects or like projects on 
the crowdfunding platform, they actually release some positive guanxi-establishing signals 
towards the potential funders before they launch their own projects. They stay in this market not 
only for seeking fund but also for helping others. From potential funders’ perspective, they are 
all project supporters or fans in the same crowdfunding community. They share similar 
motivations and mutual value as crowdfunding community members. Although they don’t know 
each other before, they are not strangers anymore as they co-habited on the same guanxi base. 
Potential funders tend to treat these dual role project developers as community members because 
of their positive guanxi-establishing signals. Therefore, they are more eager to support their 
projects based on community recognition. 
On basis of the discussions, we propose the hypotheses: 
H1：Being active crowdfunding community participants before launching their own projects is 
positively associated with fundraising success. 
H1a: A project developer who has ever been a fan of other projects before launching his (her) 
own project is positively associated with project success. 
H1b: A project developer who has ever supported other projects before launching his (her) own 
project is positively associated with project success. 
H2: The intensity of participating in the crowdfunding community before launching their own 
projects is positively associated with their project fundraising performance.  
H2a: The number of projects which a project developer has ever been a fan of before launching 
his/her own project is positively associated with his/her fundraising performance. 
H2b: The number of projects which a project developer has ever supported before launching 
his/her own project is positively associated with his/her fundraising performance.  
Davila et al. (2003) mentioned that signals are essentially snapshots pointing to unobservable 
signaler quality at a particular point in time. However, the information for signalers and receivers 
is always changing in a dynamic environment. Therefore, signalers must signal repetitively in 
order to keep signal effectiveness for reducing information asymmetry (Park & Mezias, 2005).  
Guanxi as a form of signal also needs to be maintained after its establishment in order to remain 
effective (Chung & Hamilton, 2001). Reciprocity is a distinctive characteristic of guanxi (Chung 
& Hamilton, 2001). Reciprocity means the positive benefits of mutual interaction from both 
participants in the transaction. The interaction between founders and funders is from reciprocity. 
In the case of a reciprocity cycle, initiators will post project related information as updates about 
their projects firstly. Then potential funders will offer suggestions or ask questions as the 
feedback of initiators’ updates. Then developers will try to write comments in order to answer 
their questions. This is the beginning of building guanxi between developers and potential 
funders. Founders can then refine their projects based on the funders’ suggestions and comments. 
As a result, potential funders’ perceived risk about the projects is decreased, therefore the distrust 
is eliminated due to the gradually enhanced guanxi based on the repeated reciprocity interaction. 
Therefore, the intensity of guanxi between developers and funders should influence fundraising 
performance. A project developer with more interaction with funders would generate stronger 
guanxi which leads to better fundraising result. 
Based on the analysis, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: The establishment of guanxi during the fundraising period between project initiators and 
funders is positively associated with crowdfunding success.  
H4:  Project initiators who have a stronger intensity of guanxi with funders in the fundraising 
period will have better fundraising performance.  
Data and methodology 
Data Collection 
The data of this paper is collected from zhongchou.com which is the largest reward-based 
crowdfunding platform in China. Since established in February 2013, this platform is focused on 
supporting reward-based crowdfunding projects fundraising. Similar to Kickstarter, the projects 
on zhongchou.com employ the “all-or-nothing” model. It means a project can only be recognized 
as a successful project if a project’s pledge amount surpasses the project’s target amount by the 
end date of its funding period. If a project failed to reach the target amount, the pledge will be 
returned to the funders. 
Our dataset consists of all the projects posted on zhongchou.com between January 1, 2014, and 
December 31, 2014. Only successful project information is accessible on zhongchou.com. The 
failed projects are deleted by the end of the funding period. However, following similar 
crowdfunding studies (e.g., Mollick, 2014), we wrote a web-crawler program to collect all 
project related information in the one-year period. This automatic data collecting method offers 
high levels of data validity when dealing with online data (Mollick, 2014). Over the one-year 
period, we successfully collected all project related information for 1347 projects from 
zhongchou.com. We removed all the projects under the category public. Because charity 
crowdfunding projects are donation-based crowdfunding (Hemer, 2011). In addition to public 
projects, we also removed the projects which are launched by experienced project developers in 
order to eliminate the predicted bias caused by experienced developer’s “learning by doing” 
(Hsu, 2007) behavior. It is obvious that an experienced initiator who has developed several 
projects before having a higher chance to create better candidates for future success funding 
(Gompers et al., 2010).In addition, we also identified and removed the outlier projects which 
pledges and targets are extremely large. 
After the data cleaning, our final dataset includes 989 projects from five categories (Technology, 
Publishing, Entertainment, Arts, Agriculture, and Others). We collect the following information 
about every project: project fundraising result, project total fundraising amount, project 
fundraising ratio, project duration, project target, project perk levels, project comments (funder 
and founder), has video, the length of the project description, project location, project category, 
project picture number, project fans number, project update number, and project launched month. 
Besides, whether the founder has ever liked and supported other projects before launching their 
projects were also collected. Our final dataset includes all projected related information on 989 
projects. 
Based on the collected information, we coded them into three kinds of variables in the next 
section: the dependent variable, independent variables, and control variables.  
Measures 
Dependent variables 
Success: This is a binary dummy variable. If one project’s end pledges are equal or greater than 
the fundraising target, the project can be seen as a successful project. The dummy value is one 
for successful projects. Otherwise, the dummy value is zero for failed projects.  
Pledge: The total amount of all pledges made by the backers of a crowdfunding project.  
Independent variables 
Like: This is a binary dummy variable. If one founder had ever been fans by liking projects on 
zhongchou.com, the dummy value is one. Otherwise, the dummy value is zero.  
Likenum: The total number of likes a project developer has given to other projects before 
launching his/her own project.  
Support: This is a binary dummy variable. If one founder had ever been a funder by supporting 
projects on zhongchou.com, the dummy value is one. Otherwise, the dummy value is zero.  
Supportnum: The total number of projects a project developer has supported before launching 
his/her own project. 
Guanxi: This is a binary dummy variable. If one founder has ever written comments to answer 
questions, the dummy value is one. Otherwise, the dummy value is zero. 
Guanxi intensity: Guanxi intensity can be calculated by a project developer’s total comment 
number divides by the total number of comments from both project developer and funders.  
Control variables 
Wordcount: The length of a project’s description in words.   
Video: This is a binary dummy variable. If there is a video on one project’s webpage, the dummy 
value is one. If there is no video on it, the dummy value is zero. 
Picture: The total number of pictures posted on one project’s webpage. 
Duration: The number of days for a project to raise funding. 
Perks: The number of reward perks shown on one project’s webpage.  
Fans: The total number of fans of a project.  
Update: The total number of updates of a project. 
Target: The total amount of money that the fund seekers need.  
Category: A set of dummy variables (Technology, Publishing, Entertainment, Arts, Agriculture, 
and Others) to distinguish which category one project belongs to.  
Location: A set of dummy variables to distinguish where one project was created. The projects 
come from thirty different Chinese provinces, municipalities or autonomous districts. 
Month: A set of dummy variables to distinguish in which month a project is launched. 
The descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 1. 
—Insert Table 1 about here— 
Results 
According to the results of Table 1, we noticed that some of the variables are not normally 
distributed with high skewness. To decrease regression bias, we transfer all the skewed variables 
into the natural log form.   
We calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all the variables. The average VIF is 1.04 
which is below the conventional threshold of 6, and the maximum VIF is 1.07 which is below 
the conventional threshold of 10 according to the suggestion threshold of McDonald & Moffitt 
(1980). Therefore, no multi-collinearity existed in our dataset. The correlation matrix of all 
variables is presented in Table 2.  
—Insert Table 2 about here— 
To test the hypotheses, both robust OLS regression and robust logistic regression are conducted. 
Table 3 reports the regression results by six models.  
—Insert Table 3 about here— 
In terms of model explanatory power, the value of PR2 or R2 of all our models suggests that our 
independent variables explain a substantial portion of the dependent variables. For instance, the 
minimum value of PR2 or R2 is 0.39 and the highest value is 0.57. We can state that all our 
models have adequate explanatory power. 
For the empirical results, H1a and H1b are tested by the results Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 3. 
Robust logistic regressions are conducted to estimate Model 1 and Model 2 because the 
dependent variable (Success) is binary. As expected, our independent variables (Like and Support) 
are positively associated with the success of a crowdfunding campaign (B=0.898, p < .001; 
B=0.650, p < .001). In terms of the H2, H2a and H2b are tested by Model 3 and Model 4 in 
Table 3 respectively. Robust OLS regression is chosen to test H2a and H2b. Because the 
dependent variable is crowdfunding performance (Ln_pledge) which is a continuous variable. 
According to the results in Table 3, Ln_likenum and Ln_supportnum have positive influences on 
project performance (B=0.328, p < .001; B=0.428, p < .001). To sum up, we find evidence that 
the presence of project developers’ guanxi-establishing behavior before launching their projects 
is positively associated with crowdfunding success (H1) and the intensity of the guanxi-
establishing behavior positively affect project fundraising performance. H3 and H4 are tested by 
Model 5 and Model 6 in Table 3. Robust logistic regression is used to estimate Model 5 and 
Robust OLS regression is used to estimate Model 6. According to the results in Table 3, Guanxi 
is positively associated with crowdfunding project success (B=2.018, p < .001). Guanxi intensity 
significantly influences crowdfunding project performance (B=1.224, p < .001). The results 
proved that the presence of project developers’ guanxi-establishing behavior during the 
fundraising period is positively associated with crowdfunding success (H1) and the intensity of 
the guanxi positively affect project fundraising performance.  
In addition, our findings for the effects of control variables are similar to prior studies (e.g., 
Mollick, 2014; Colombo et al., 2015). For instance, Target and Duration are negative and 
significant (p < .001) in predicting crowdfunding success and fundraising performance. Video, 
Ln_wordcount, and Ln_picture as quality signals are positively and significantly (p < .001) 
related to crowdfunding success and fundraising performance.  
—Insert Table 4 about here— 
To examine the robustness of our results, we conduct additional estimates of our models. We use 
the natural log transformation of fundrate (Ln_fundrate) as a new dependent variable to re-
estimate the six models (Fundrate is the ratio of Pledge and Target). The results of the new 
estimations are reported in Table 4. According to the results of Table 4, our results are still 
robust if we use Ln_fundrate as the new dependent variable to estimate crowdfunding success 
and performance. Specifically, all the coefficients of Like, Support, Ln_likenum, Ln_supportnum, 
Guanxi, and Guanxi intensity are positive and significant (p <.001) in all six Models of Table 4.  
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper investigates the role of guanxi on the success and performance of reward-based 
crowdfunding projects in China. By analyzing a sample of 989 projects from the largest reward-
based crowdfunding platform in China, we found that guanxi plays an important role in Chinese 
reward-based crowdfunding context. 
 
There are some limitations in this paper. First, the results of this study are only based on the 
largest crowdfunding platform in China. Whether the result of this study can be used to explain 
other Chinese reward-based crowdfunding practice is still suspending. At this point, this study is 
meant to describe what happens, but a more comprehensive study is needed to increase the 
generalizability of the findings. A more systematic analysis based on more attainable data is 
necessary to probe the success factors of the Chinese crowdfunding campaign. Second, this 
paper only studies the influence of guanxi on crowdfunding success in the reward-based 
crowdfunding context. Whether our findings can be used to explain project success and project 
performance in other crowdfunding models is still unknown. Third, crowdfunding in China is 
still emerging. Our research dataset which including 989 projects is relatively small when 
compared to similar empirical crowdfunding studies based on western markets.  
 
This paper makes significant theoretical contributions. This paper is also one of the first to 
examine the role of guanxi in the Chinese crowdfunding context. Existing crowdfunding success 
literature tends to use project quality signals and social capital to explain crowdfunding success 
universally. But there is little literature on the effect of guanxi on crowdfunding projects. This 
paper facilitates the understanding of crowdfunding success in a relation-based emerging market 
by taking guanxi and guanxi intensity into consideration. Our findings show that guanxi plays an 
important role in Chinese crowdfunding context. The main reason for the significant relationship 
between guanxi and crowdfunding results is because Chinese business market is relation-based. 
In terms of reward-based crowdfunding market in China, as a new fundraising channel, 
regulations in this market are not only inadequate but also incomplete. Therefore, project 
developers may overstate their project qualities in order to get funded successfully. In a relation-
based environment, the interpersonal relationship is more important than regulations to form the 
trust. The measure of interpersonal trust in China is guanxi. Guanxi has been long embedded in 
Chinese business practice. Based on our results, we found that guanxi also plays an important 
role in the crowdfunding context. Specifically, project developers’ guanxi-establishing behavior 
conducted both before launching and during fundraising significantly influence crowdfunding 
success and fundraising performance in a positive way. In addition, the intensity of such guanxi 
related behavior also matters to crowdfunding result. The effectiveness of guanxi related factors 
is based on Chinese unique social characteristics. In addition, our findings also extend the trust 
theory and signaling theory by taking guanxi as a signal to establish trust. Further, this paper 
provides a starting point to examine Chinese crowdfunding phenomenon. It is of great value to 
explore crowdfunding practice in different cultural and social backgrounds which are 
enrichments of crowdfunding literature.  
 
Besides, this paper also provides some practical implications for crowdfunding platform creators 
and project developers. First, it is important for project developers to provide detailed project 
information of their projects such as detailed project description, descriptive video, and vivid 
pictures. These quality signals will make potential funders feel these projects are of high quality. 
At the same time, project developers should also establish and maintain guanxi with the potential 
funders both before and after launching their projects. In order to strengthen the guanxi, project 
developers should conduct repeated reciprocity interaction with funders through posting updates 
and answering questions. Second, Chinese reward-based crowdfunding platform creators should 
offer different ways to facilitate the guanxi establishment and maintenance process between 
project developers and funders. For example, the crowdfunding platform should embed some 
instant chatting tools on projects’ websites in order to facilitate interactions between project 
developers and funders.  
 
References 
Agrawal, A. K., Catalini, C., & Goldfarb, A. (2011). The geography of crowdfunding (No. 
w16820). National bureau of economic research. 
Ba, S., & Pavlou, P. A. (2002). Evidence of the effect of trust building technology in electronic 
markets: Price premiums and buyer behavior. MIS quarterly, 243-268. 
Belleflamme, P., Lambert, T., & Schwienbacher, A. (2013). Crowdfunding: Tapping the right 
crowd. Journal of Business Venturing. 
Boisot, M., & Child, J. (1996). From fiefs to clans and network capitalism: Explaining China's 
emerging economic order. Administrative Science Quarterly, 600-628. 
Casimir, G., Waldman, D. A., Bartram, T., & Yang, S. (2006). Trust and the relationship 
between leadership and follower performance: Opening the black box in Australia and China. 
Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 12(3), 68-84.  
Chellappa, R. K. (2008). Consumers’ trust in electronic commerce transactions: The role of 
perceived privacy and perceived security. Under submission. 
Chen, S. C., & Dhillon, G. S. (2003). Interpreting dimensions of consumer trust in e-commerce. 
Information Technology and Management, 4(2-3), 303-318.  
Chen, X. P., & Chen, C. C. (2004). On the intricacies of the Chinese guanxi: A process model of 
guanxi development. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 21(3), 305-324. 
Cho, J., & Lee, J. (2006). An integrated model of risk and risk-reducing strategies. Journal of 
Business Research, 59(1), 112-120. 
Chung, W. K., & Hamilton, G. G. (2001). Social logic as business logic: Guanxi, trustworthiness, 
and the embeddedness of Chinese business practices. Rules and networks: The legal culture of 
global business transactions, 325-346. 
Colombo, M. G., Franzoni, C., & Rossi‐Lamastra, C. (2015). Internal social capital and the 
attraction of early contributions in crowdfunding. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(1), 
75-100. 
Connelly, B. L., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, L., & Certo, S. T. (2010). Ownership as a form of 
corporate governance. Journal of Management Studies, 47(8), 1561-1589. 
Davila, A., Foster, G., & Gupta, M. (2003). Venture capital financing and the growth of startup 
firms. Journal of business venturing, 18(6), 689-708. 
Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2010). Social enterprise in Europe: At the crossroads of market, 
public policies and third sector. Policy and Society, 29(3), 231-242.  
Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence of national 
culture on the development of trust. Academy of management review, 23(3), 601-620. 
Fei, X. (1992). From the soil, the foundations of Chinese society: a translation of Fei Xiaotong's 
Xiangtu Zhongguo, with an introduction and epilogue. Univ of California Press. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity (pp. 61-77). New 
York: Free Press. 
Ganguly, B., Dash, S. B., Cyr, D., & Head, M. (2010). The effects of website design on purchase 
intention in online shopping: the mediating role of trust and the moderating role of culture. 
International Journal of Electronic Business, 8(4), 302-330. 
Giudici, G., Guerini, M., & Rossi Lamastra, C. (2013). Why crowdfunding projects can succeed: 
the role of proponents’ individual and territorial social capital. Available at SSRN 2255944. 
Gompers, P., Kovner, A., Lerner, J., & Scharfstein, D. (2010). Performance persistence in 
entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(1), 18-32. 
Grabner-Kräuter, S., & Kaluscha, E. A. (2003). Empirical research in on-line trust: a review and 
critical assessment. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 58(6), 783-812.  
Gregg, D. G., & Walczak, S. (2008). Dressing your online auction business for success: An 
experiment comparing two eBay businesses. Mis Quarterly, 653-670. 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related values. 
Cross-cultural research. 
Hsu, D. H. (2007). Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and venture 
capital funding. Research Policy, 36(5), 722-741. 
Hui, C. H., & Triandis, H. C. (1986). Individualism-collectivism a study of cross-cultural 
researchers. Journal of cross-cultural psychology, 17(2), 225-248. 
Hui, J., Greenberg, M., & Gerber, E. (2013, April). Understanding crowdfunding work: 
implications for support tools. In CHI'13 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems (pp. 889-894). ACM. 
Jacobs, J. B. (1979). A preliminary model of particularistic ties in Chinese political alliances: 
Kan-ch'ing and Kuan-hsi in a rural Taiwanese township. The China Quarterly, 78, 237-273.  
James Jr, H. S. (2002). The trust paradox: a survey of economic inquiries into the nature of trust 
and trustworthiness. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 47(3), 291-307. 
Johnstone, R. A., & Grafen, A. (1993). Dishonesty and the handicap principle. Animal Behavior, 
46(4), 759-764. 
Kim, D. J., Ferrin, D. L., & Rao, H. R. (2008). A trust-based consumer decision-making model 
in electronic commerce: The role of trust, perceived risk, and their antecedents. Decision support 
systems, 44(2), 544-564. 
Kini, A., & Choobineh, J. (1998, January). Trust in electronic commerce: definition and 
theoretical considerations. In System Sciences, 1998, Proceedings of the Thirty-First Hawaii 
International Conference on (Vol. 4, pp. 51-61). IEEE.  
Kiong, T. C., & Kee, Y. P. (1998). Guanxi bases, Xinyong and Chinese business networks. 
British Journal of Sociology, 75-96. 
Kuppuswamy, V., & Bayus, B. L. (2014). Crowdfunding creative ideas: The dynamics of project 
backers in Kickstarter. UNC Kenan-Flagler Research Paper, (2013-15). 
Lambert, T., & Schwienbacher, A. (2010). An empirical analysis of crowdfunding. Social 
Science Research Network, 1578175. 
Lee, D. Y., & Dawes, P. L. (2005). Guanxi, trust, and long-term orientation in Chinese business 
markets. Journal of International Marketing, 13(2), 28-56. 
Lee, M. K., & Turban, E. (2001). A trust model for consumer internet shopping. International 
Journal of electronic commerce, 6, 75-92. 
Lehner, O. M. (2013). Crowdfunding social ventures: a model and research agenda. Venture 
Capital, 15(4), 289-311. 
Martinsons, M. G. (2008). Relationship‐based e‐commerce: theory and evidence from China. 
Information Systems Journal, 18(4), 331-356. 
Masssolution. (2013). Crowdfunding industry report: Market trends, composition and 
crowdfunding platforms. Massolution. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational 
trust. Academy of management review, 20(3), 709-734. 
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal 
cooperation in organizations. Academy of management journal, 38(1), 24-59.  
McDonald, J. F., & Moffitt, R. A. (1980). The uses of Tobit analysis. The review of economics 
and statistics, 318-321. 
McKnight, D. H., Cummings, L. L., & Chervany, N. L. (1998). Initial trust formation in new 
organizational relationships. Academy of management review, 23(3), 473-490. 
Mollick, E. (2014). The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 29(1), 1-16.  
Park, N. K., & Mezias, J. M. (2005). Before and after the technology sector crash: the effect of 
environmental munificence on stock market response to alliances of e-commerce firms. Strategic 
Management Journal, 26(11), 987. 
Pavlou, P. A. (2003). Consumer acceptance of electronic commerce: integrating trust and risk 
with the technology acceptance model. International journal of electronic commerce, 7(3), 101-
134. 
Ramos, J. (2014). Crowdfunding and the role of managers in ensuring the sustainability of 
crowdfunding platforms. JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, 85752. 
Rotter, J. B. (1971). Generalized expectancies for interpersonal trust. American psychologist, 
26(5), 443. 
Schwienbacher, A., & Larralde, B. (2010). Crowdfunding of small entrepreneurial ventures. 
SSRN Electronic Journal. 
Shapiro, D. L., Sheppard, B. H., & Cheraskin, L. (1992). Business on a handshake. Negotiation 
journal, 8(4), 365-377.  
Spence, M. (2002). Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets. American 
Economic Review, 434-459. 
Staber, U. (2006). Social capital processes in cross cultural management. International Journal 
of Cross Cultural Management, 6(2), 189-203. 
Stephens, R.T. (2004) ‘A framework for the identification of electronic commerce design 
elements that enable trust within the small hotel industry’, ACMSE ’04, 2–3 April, Huntsville, 
Alabama, USA. 
Tan, F.B. and Sutherland, P. (2004) ‘Online consumer trust: a multi-dimensional model’, Journal 
of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, July–September, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.40–58. 
Teo, H. H., Oh, L. B., Liu, C., & Wei, K. K. (2003). An empirical study of the effects of 
interactivity on web user attitude. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 58(3), 281-
305. 
Wang, Y. D., & Emurian, H. H. (2004). Inducing consumer trust online: an empirical approach 
to testing e-commerce interface design features. In Proceedings of the International Conference 
of the Information Resources Management Association: Innovations Through Information 
Technology (pp. 41-44). 
World Bank. (2013). Crowdfunding’s Potential for the Developing World. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Xu, A., Yang, X., Rao, H., Fu, W. T., Huang, S. W., & Bailey, B. P. (2014, April). Show me the 
money! : An analysis of project updates during crowdfunding campaigns. In Proceedings of the 
32nd annual ACM conference on Human factors in computing systems (pp. 591-600). ACM. 
Yoon, S-J. (2002) ‘The antecedents and consequences of trust in online purchase decisions’, 
Journal of Interactive Marketing, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.47–63. 
Zheng, H., Hung, J. L., Qi, Z., & Xu, B. (2016). The role of trust management in reward-based 
crowdfunding. Online Information Review, 40(1), 97-118. 
Zvilichovsky, D., Inbar, Y., & Barzilay, O. (2014). Playing both sides of the market: success and 


































Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S. D. Min Max 
Pledge 989 26100.58 93492.56 1.00 1271230.00 
Fundrate 989 1.17 2.84 0.01 63.72 
Success 989 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Like 989 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Likenum 989 39.32 92.99 0.00 1218.00 
Support 989 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Supportnum 989 1.21 3.31 0.00 65.00 
Guanxi 989 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Guanxi_intensity 989 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.94 
Video 989 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Wordcount 989 1531.80 1262.11 13.00 13913.00 
Picture 989 7.17 6.00 1.00 38.00 
Update 989 3.38 3.88 1.00 26.00 
Target 989 33033.99 92052.72 1000.00 1000000.00 
Fans 989 186.88 433.27 3.00 5575.00 
Perks 989 6.46 2.23 2.00 30.00 







Table 2  Correlation Matrix  
 Like Support Ln_likenum Ln_supportnum Guanxi Guanxi_intensity Video Ln_picture Ln_wordcount Ln_update Ln_fans Ln_duration Perks Ln_traget 
Like 1 
             
Support -0.019 1 
            
Ln_likenum 0.011 0.812*** 1 
           
Ln_supportnum 0.86*** 0.026 0.045 1 
          
Guanxi -0.001 0.090*** 0.129*** 0.117*** 1 
         
Guanxi_intensity 0.034 0.034 0.088*** 0.145*** 0.859*** 1 
        
Video 0.06* 0.057* 0.035 0.159*** 0.251*** 0.157*** 1 
       
Ln_picture 0 -0.005 -0.004 0.067** 0.099*** 0.079** 0.137*** 1 
      
Ln_wordcount 0.07** 0.081** 0.057* 0.087*** 0.047 0.047 0.132*** -0.013 1 
     
Ln_update -0.065** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.096*** 0.617*** 0.476*** 0.367*** 0.192*** 0.069** 1 
    
Ln_fans 0.092*** -0.011 -0.031 0.272*** 0.328*** 0.299*** 0.283*** 0.062* 0.070** 0.393*** 1 
   
Ln_duration -0.116** -0.063** -0.086*** -0.120*** 0.085*** 0.032 0.001 0.134*** 0.031 0.216*** 0.048 1 
  
Perks -0.028 0.049 0.015 0.034 0.02 0.019 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.032 0.114*** 0.090*** 0.160*** 1 
 
Ln_traget -0.065** -0.060* -0.080** 0.168*** -0.049 -0.031 -0.002 0.063** -0.053* 0.061* 0.176*** 0.147*** 0.175*** 1 





Table 3 Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Success Success Ln_pledge Ln_pledge Success Ln_pledge 
Like 0.898***      
 (0.178)      
Support  0.650***     
  (0.177)     
Ln_likenum   0.328***    
   (0.027)    
Ln_supportnum    0.428***   
    (0.077)   
Guanxi     2.018***  
     (0.296)  
Guanxi_intensity      1.224*** 
      (0.277) 
Video 1.632*** 1.661*** 0.513*** 0.628*** 1.709*** 0.638*** 
 (0.186) (0.183) (0.115) (0.121) (0.188) (0.122) 
Ln_picture 0.406*** 0.415*** 0.195*** 0.242*** 0.427*** 0.235*** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.054) (0.058) (0.103) (0.059) 
Ln_wordcount 0.185 0.189* 0.123** 0.149*** 0.216** 0.159*** 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.043) (0.044) (0.073) (0.044) 
Ln_update 0.516*** 0.366** 0.470*** 0.394*** -0.069 0.350*** 
 (0.125) (0.124) (0.065) (0.07) (0.141) (0.073) 
Ln_fans 0.917*** 0.966*** 0.709*** 0.840*** 0.894*** 0.795*** 
 (0.088) (0.09) (0.052) (0.055) (0.09) (0.055) 
Ln_duration -1.067*** -1.050*** -0.554*** -0.643*** -1.053*** -0.671*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.073) (0.079) (0.161) (0.079) 
Perks 0.072 0.058 -0.008 -0.013 0.074 -0.007 
 (0.05) (0.045) (0.023) (0.024) (0.048) (0.024) 
Ln_traget -0.400*** -0.398*** 0.419*** 0.501*** -0.359*** 0.500*** 
 (0.07) (0.069) (0.044) (0.046) (0.069) (0.047) 
Cons -0.291 -0.204 0.635 -0.146 -0.268 0.215 
 (0.941) (0.922) (0.506) (0.542) (0.919) (0.547) 
Category FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 989 989 989 989 989 989 
Pr2 0.387 0.379   0.401  
r2   0.571 0.524  0.517 
F   148.119 123.211  116.12 




Table 4 Robustness Check 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Ln_fundrate Ln_fundrate Ln_fundrate Ln_fundrate Ln_fundrate Ln_fundrate 
Like 0.395***      
 (0.087)      
Support  0.457***     
  (0.089)     
Ln_likenum   0.669***    
   (0.107)    
Ln_supportnum    0.286***   
    (0.023)   
Guanxi     0.373***  
     (0.066)  
Guanxi_intensity      1.251*** 
      (0.24) 
Video 0.604*** 0.626*** 0.622*** 0.537*** 0.637*** 0.649*** 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.099) (0.093) (0.1) (0.099) 
Ln_picture 0.212*** 0.224*** 0.220*** 0.182*** 0.222*** 0.216*** 
 (0.049) (0.05) (0.05) (0.045) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ln_wordcount 0.116** 0.112** 0.126*** 0.092* 0.115** 0.123*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Ln_update 0.446*** 0.371*** 0.231*** 0.426*** 0.360*** 0.305*** 
 (0.058) (0.06) (0.066) (0.055) (0.06) (0.061) 
Ln_fans 0.628*** 0.662*** 0.623*** 0.552*** 0.667*** 0.623*** 
 (0.04) (0.041) (0.04) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
Ln_duration -0.556*** -0.549*** -0.569*** -0.462*** -0.539*** -0.562*** 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.061) (0.066) (0.066) 
Perks -0.004 -0.012 -0.001 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.02) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ln_traget -0.384*** -0.385*** -0.374*** -0.454*** -0.383*** -0.382*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) 
Cons -0.245 -0.276 -0.119 0.322 -0.358 -0.054 
 (0.462) (0.456) (0.456) (0.424) (0.454) (0.458) 
Category FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 989 989 989 989 989 989 
r2 0.5 0.504 0.503 0.561 0.506 0.5 
F 121.612 124.936 131.361 164.217 125.463 118.948 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.01, ** p<.005, *** p<.001 
5 
 
 
